



Securing an API World

A POSITIVE SECURITY MODEL FOR APIS

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Introducing Security Models



NEGATIVE SECURITY MODEL (BLACKLIST)



Access **Allowed**
by default



Block access for
suspicious traffic



Threats centric



POSITIVE SECURITY MODEL (WHITELIST)



Access **Denied** by
default



Allow Access only
to **approved**
traffic



Trust centric



WHY A POSITIVE MODEL ?

- ▶ Much stricter access control
- ▶ Limited false positives
- ▶ More efficient
 - ✓ Simple vs. very complex regular expressions for blacklisting
- ▶ No need to update when new threats are found





However...



KEEPING UP IS HARD...

- ▶ A whitelist is only powerful if complete!
- ▶ It requires lots of efforts to define and maintain up to date with constant applications changes
 - ✓ High human cost, usually several people full time
- ▶ Traditionally been very hard to implement
 - ✓ Which is why default WAF model is blacklisting





...BUT APIS ARE DIFFERENT!

- ▶ OpenAPI specification (OAS) can be leveraged to describe the **API contract**.
- ▶ Can be easily updated from code, or via specialized tools, so the whitelist is always in sync with the application.
- ▶ You can start addressing security straight from design time!
- ▶ OpenAPI lets you build the **ultimate whitelist!**
 - ✓ And as bonus , you get better documentation!




OPENAPI INITIATIVE





HOW 42CRUNCH LEVERAGES OAS

Scan service ensures API implementation **conforms to API contract**



Audit Service performs **200+** **security checks** on API Contract

Protection service is **automatically configured** from API contract



OWASP API SECURITY TOP 10

- **API1** : Broken Object Level Authorisation
- **API2** : Broken Authentication
- **API3** : Excessive Data Exposure
- **API4** : Lack of Resources & Rate Limiting
- **API5** : Missing Function/Resource Level Access Control
- **API6** : Mass Assignment
- **API7** : Security Misconfiguration
- **API8** : Injection
- **API9** : Improper Assets Management
- **API10** : Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

CHEAT SHEET

OWASP API Security Top 10

[DOWNLOAD](#)

A top-down view of a person's hands typing on a keyboard in a dark room. The scene is filled with computer equipment, including a laptop on the left, a large monitor at the top, and another monitor on the right. The background is dark with a pattern of glowing green binary code (0s and 1s). A large, semi-transparent purple circle is centered over the keyboard. The text "Addressing API threats with a positive model" is overlaid in white, bold font across the center of the image.

Addressing API threats with a positive model



EQUIFAX AND MANY MORE COMPANIES (2017)

<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/apache-0-day-exploited.html>

► The Attack

- ✓ Remote command injection attack: server executes commands written in ONGL language when a Content-Type validation error is raised.
- ✓ Can also be exploited using the Content-Disposition or Content-Length headers

```
► POST / HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: %{(#Normal='multipart/form-data').(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#{_memberAccess?
(_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).
(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).
(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear())).
(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm))}.(#cmd='whoami')).
(#iswin=@java.lang.System.getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/
c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).
(#process=#p.start()).(#ros=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext.getResponse()).getOutputStream()).
(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).(#ros.flush())}
Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, */*
Accept-Language: zh-CN
```

► The Breach

- ✓ One of the most important in history: 147 millions people worldwide, very sensitive data
- ✓ Equifax got fined \$700 million in Sept 2019

► Core Issue

- ✓ Remote command injection vulnerability in Apache Struts widely exploited during months.

A1

A2

A3

A4

A5

A6

A7

A8

A9

A10



CONTENT-TYPE IN OAS

- ▶ Declare “consumes” at API or operation level

```
"consumes": [  
  "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",  
  "application/json"  
],
```

- ✓ Limits **Content-Type** header value to specific mime types
- ▶ Declare all request headers



HOW 42CRUNCH ADDRESSES THE PROBLEM

▶ At **Audit** time

- ✓ Detect that **Consumes** is not defined

▶ At **Scan** time

- ✓ Inject wrong Content-Type
- ✓ Inject wrong formats for all listed headers

▶ At **Runtime**

- ✓ Block any Content-Type that does not match Consumes value at Runtime
- ✓ Block any header not matching the description
- ✓ Block inbound data that does not match the Content-Type



HARBOUR REGISTRY

<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/critical-vulnerability-in-harbor-enables-privilege-escalation-from-zero-to-admin-cve-2019-16097/>

▶ The Attack

- ✓ Privilege escalation: become registry administrator

▶ The Breach

- ✓ 1300+ registries with default security settings

▶ Core Issue

- ✓ Mass Assignment vulnerability allows any normal user to become an admin

```
POST /api/users
{"username":"test","email":"test123@gmail.com","realname":"noname","password":"Password1\u0021","comment":null,"has_admin_role" = True}
```



A1

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HOW OAS CAN BE USED ?

- ▶ Describe inbound schema for all requests
- ▶ Use different schemas by operation (retrieve user data vs. update user data)

```
"UsersItem": {
  "type": "object",
  "additionalProperties": false,
  "properties": {
    "_id": {
      "type": "number",
      "format": "integer",
      "minimum": 0,
      "maximum": 999999
    },
    "email": {
      "type": "string",
      "format": "email",
      "pattern": "<email_regex>",
      "minLength": 10,
      "maxLength": 60
    },
    "is_admin": {
      "description": "is admin",
      "type": "boolean"
    }
  },
  ...
}
```




HOW 42CRUNCH ADDRESSES THE PROBLEM

▶ At **Audit** time

- ✓ Detects that schemas are not associated to requests
- ✓ Analyzes how well data is defined (patterns, min, max, enums)
- ✓ Highlights usage of “additional properties”

▶ At **Scan** time

- ✓ Injects additional properties
- ✓ Injects improper data

▶ At **Runtime**

- ✓ Enforces schema definition
- ✓ Enforces Additional Properties restrictions
- ✓ Block non-declared VERBs (block unwanted POST)



UBER (SEPT 2019)

▶ The Attack

- ✓ Account takeover for any Uber account from a phone number

▶ The Breach

- ✓ None. This was a bug bounty.

▶ Core Issues

- ✓ First Data leakage : driver internal UUID exposed through error message!

```
{
  "status": "failure",
  "data": {
    "code": 1009,
    "message": "Driver '47d063f8-0xx5e-xxxxx-b01a-xxxx' not found"
  }
}
```

- ✓ Second Data leakage via the `getConsentScreenDetails` operation: full account information is returned, when only a few fields are used by the UI. This includes the **mobile token** used to login onto the account

A1

A2

A3

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HOW OAS CAN BE USED ?

- ▶ Describe thoroughly **all** potential responses
- ▶ Define the **produces** value
 - ✓ Which data will be returned

- ▶ Use different schemas by operation (retrieve user data vs. update user data)

```
"produces": [
  "application/json"
],
"responses": {
  "200": {
    "description": "successful..",
    "schema": {
      "type": "array",
      "minItems": 0,
      "maxItems": 50,
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/definitions/
UsersItem"
      }
    }
  },
  "403": {
    "description": "invalid...",
    "schema": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "message": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "xxxx",
          "minLength": 1,
          "maxLength": 255
        }
      }
    },
    "success": ...
  }
}
```



HOW 42CRUNCH ADDRESSES THE PROBLEM

▶ At **Audit** time

- ✓ Analyzes which responses should be defined depending on verb (GET, POST, ...)
- ✓ Detects that schemas are not associated to responses
- ✓ Analyzes how well data is defined (patterns, min, max, enums)
- ✓ Highlights usage of “additional properties”

▶ At **Scan** time

- ✓ Validates responses are all defined in contract
- ✓ Validates responses match schemas defined in contract


▶ At **Runtime**

- ✓ Block responses that do not match “Produces” value (unknown mime-type)
- ✓ Blocks responses that do not match schema definition
- ✓ Block non-declared responses (unknown HTTP codes)
- ✓ Enforces Additional Properties restrictions



A POSITIVE MODEL FOR API SECURITY WITH 42CRUNCH

- ▶ Leverage OAS and build the ultimate whitelist at **design** time!
 - ✓ Right in your IDE with our VSCode extension
 - ✓ Thorough report with priorities to act upon
- ▶ Ensure API Contract is up to date via automated audit and scan at **integration/testing** time
 - ✓ Include API Contract audit and scan in your favorite CI/CD pipeline
- ▶ Leverage the power of OAS to protect your APIs at **runtime**
 - ✓ Lightweight, Kubernetes-ready firewall to automatically protect your APIs from API contract!





Securing an API World

CONTACT US:

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Start testing your API contracts today on apisecurity.io!

RESOURCES

- [42Crunch Website](#)
- [Free OAS Security Audit](#)
- [OpenAPI VS Code Extension](#)
- [OpenAPI Spec Encyclopedia](#)
- [OWASP API Security Top 10](#)
- [APIsecurity.io](#)

